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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, ET AL., 
Defendants & Appellants, 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Intervenor & Respondent. 
Case No. 
8457 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Martin M. Larson presiding. This action was brought by 
respondent in the form of a petition for intervention in the 
case of University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, et al., 
now pending before this Court. The motion to intervene 
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2 
was granted. A judgment was entered settling the dispute 
between the University and the Board of Education. There-
after, by stipulation of all parties, approved by the trial 
court, the matters between the University of Utah and 
Board of Examiners, on the one hand, and the State Board 
of Education and the Board of Examiners, on the other 
hand, were separately argued and separately determined. 
Thus, the two branches of the case are now in fact two 
separate cases independent of one another. 
By their complaint, the State Board of Education sought 
a declaratory judgment as to certain issues which may be 
generally classed as follows : 
( 1) Whether the Board of Examiners has authority 
to examine and approve or disapprove expenditures prev-
iously authorized by the State Board of Education and, if 
so, whether the exercise of such authority is discretionary 
or ministerial. 
( 2) Whether the Commission of Finance has author-
ity to examine and approve or disapprove expenditures 
previously authorized by the State Board of Education and, 
if so, whether the exercise of such authority is discretion-
ary or ministerial. 
(3) Whether the Commission of Finance has author-
ity to approve or disapprove appointments of employees 
made by the State Board of Education. 
(4) Whether the Budget Officer, in conjunction with 
the Governor, has authority to approve or disapprove work 
programs submitted by the State Board of Education. 
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3 
(5) \Vhether the Attorney General has the right to 
disapprove the appointment of independent legal counsel 
to represent the State Board of Education in cases involv-
ing disputes with another department or agency of the 
State. 
These issues were submitted to the court on the plead-
n 
t' ings, stipulation of facts (R. 24-56) and documentary evi-
dence introduced by respondent (R. 78) over the objection 
of appellants. No witnesses testified. Briefs were filed and 
rn oral argument was had. Thereafter, the trial court ren-
dered its opinion (R. 57-68) and granted judgment to 
respondent (R. 72-73). 
As we understand the opinion and judgment of the 
trial court, it was determined : 
( 1) That the Board of Examiners has no jurisdiction 
m over expenditures for salaries but does have a limited min-
isterial authority over all other expenditures of the State 
Board of Education. 
(2) That the Commission of Finance has only a lim-
ited ministerial authority over expenditures of the State 
Board of Education. 
(3) That the Commission of Finance may disapprove 
the appointment of employees of the State Board of Edu-
cation unless such employees are "experts or specially 
qualified personnel." 
( 4) That the Budget Officer and the Governor have 
no authority to disapprove work programs submitted by 
the State Board of Education unless such work programs 
exceed appropriated funds. 
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( 5) That the State Board of Education may retain 
legal counsel, independent of the Attorney General, when 
the Attorney General represents another department with 
which the Board of Education has a dispute. 
As can be seen, the results sought and the judgment 
granted relate primarily to supervision of the financial 
activities of the State Board of Education by other state 
departments and agencies. As the State Board of Educa-
tion and the agencies it controls is one of the three largest 
departments of the State, spending from one fourth to one 
third of total State revenues, the result of this case is of 
great importance. We suggest, however, that because of 
the reasons advanced for the judgment, the judgment, if 
sustained, would also have far-reaching effects on the 
financial operations of all departments of the State as well 
as the State Board of Education. Furthermore, the theory 
and conclusion of the trial court that the State Board of 
Education is a fourth branch of government with constitu-
tionally vested powers would alter the present relationship 
of the State Board of Education to the Legislative and 
Judicial as well as the Executive Branches of our State 
Government. We ask the Court to keep these broader 
aspects in mind when considering this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AU-
THORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE 
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ALLEXPENDITURESOFTHESTATEBOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
POINT II 
BY STATUTE, THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES 
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE, AS AGENT 
OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR BY 
STATUTE, HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR 
DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHOR-
IZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINT-
MENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, INCLUDING 
EXPERTS AND SPECIALLY QUALIFIED PER-
SONNEL. 
POINT V 
THE DUTY OF THE BUDGET OFFICER, 
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVER-
NOR, TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK 
PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
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POINT VI 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IS NOT 
A FOURTH BRANCH OF STATE GOVERN-
MENT. 
POINT VII 
IN DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE DEPART-
MENTS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS 
DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO APPOINT 
COUNSEL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AU-
THORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE 
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of the State of 
Utah provides : 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Secretary of State and Attorney General shall con-
stitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, 
which Board shall have such supervision of all mat-
ters connected with the State Prison as may be 
provided by law. They shall, also, constitute a Board 
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State, except salaries or compensation 
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law · and no claim 
against the State, except for salarie~ and compen-
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sation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon 
by the Legislature without having been considered 
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners." 
This or similar provisions are contained in the constitutions 
of only four states: Utah, Idaho, Nevada and Montana. 
In all these states, the Board exercises highly important 
functions commensurate with the position of the members 
of the Board who, as the highest elected officials of the 
respective states, are directly responsible to the people. 
It is our contention that under the Utah Constitution, 
the Board of Examiners has the right and responsibility 
to approve or disapprove expenditures of state funds by 
all departments and agencies of the State, including the 
State Board of Education. This is not a mere ministerial 
function but an authorization to inquire into the !ldvisability 
or necessity of a particular expenditure. It is obvious that 
the Board also has the authority to deny illegal expenditures 
of public funds. There is one exception to the jurisdiction 
of the Board-salaries or compensation of officers fixed 
by law. As will appear from the cases, this exception is 
limited to salaries or compensation fixed in a sum certain 
by the Legislature and does not include salaries or com-
pensation fixed by a board, department or agency of the 
State other than the Legislature. 
The primary check on the power of the Board is by 
appeal to the Legislature whose decision is final. A second 
check on this power is through the courts who can ( 1) 
prevent arbitrary action by the Board, (2) require the 
Board to take some action on a claim, to either approve or 
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disapprove it, but not control the discretion of the Board 
to either approve or disapprove, and (3) require approval 
of a claim where the sole reason for its disapproval was a 
misinterpretation of the legality of the claim by the Board 
(this third situation should be distinguished from disap-
proval of a claim where the Board regards it an unnecessary 
or unwise expenditure of state funds-in that event, a court 
can only inquire into the arbitrariness, if any, of the action 
taken, the claimant being left with an appeal to the Legis-
lature on the question of the advisability of the expendi-
ture). 
A. The Jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners. 
1. Generally. 
A clear statement of the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Examiners is found in State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 
Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720. There, a claim was made by a court 
stenographer, appointed by a district judge pursuant to 
statute, for mileage allowed him by statute for travel in 
the course of his official duties. The amount claimed had 
been approved and certified as correct by the District Judge, 
all in compliance with the applicable statute (Sees. 1 & 2, 
Ch. 72, Laws of Utah 1899). The statute in question re-
quired the Auditor to draw his "·arrant for the amount 
certified by the District Judge with no requirement that 
the claim be approved by the Board of Exa1uiners. Nat-
withstanding, the Court held that the claim must first be 
submitted to the Board by virtue of Article VII, Section 13 
-a mandatory provision which could not be avoided by 
the claimant, the Legislature, or a court. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
The Court stated (33 Utah at 250) : 
"The attempt by the Legislature to require the 
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution 
must first be approved by the Board of Examiners 
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the 
constitutional provision. The Legislature is so 
bound, and so are we. The Legislature may make 
certain evidence conclusive with regard to a specific 
matter, but it may not interfere with powers con-
ferred or duties imposed by the Constitution. This 
in effect is what is attempted to be done in section 
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the 
provisions of that section are in conflict with the 
constitutional provision governing salaries and com-
pensations of officers fixed by law, the Constitution 
must prevail. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434, 
was an action seeking mandamus against the State Auditor 
to compel issuance of warrants in payment of bounty certifi-
cates. Admittedly, all the requirements of the bounty law 
had been met and the sole question was whether the bounty 
claims must be approved by the Board of Examiners before 
payment where the applicable statute made no such re-
quirement. The Court held first that the bounty claims 
were- claims against the State as they were claims for 
money "paid into the state treasury * * * subject to 
1 appropriation by the Legislature, and [payable only] by 
the state treasurer on warrant of the state auditor." It 
1 was argued that the claims were fixed by law at so much 
1 per pelt, became liquidated demands when the county clerk 
J certified the number of pelts, and thus did not come within 
I the jurisdiction of the Board. The Court replied that the 
only exception to the jurisdiction of the Board is "salaries 
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10 
and compensation of officers fixed by law." Furthermore, 
(77 Utah at 465) : 
"If we should adopt petitioner's view it would 
follow that the Legislature might designate any offi-
cer other than the board of examiners as authorized 
in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or liquidate 
claims and agree upon the amount to be paid there-
on, and thereby exclude the board of examiners from 
its duty and responsibility with respect to claims 
thus liquidated pursuant to legislative authority. 
We cannot agree to any such construction of the 
constitutional language, nor may we by construction 
interpolate the word 'unliquidated' into the Consti-
tution so that it would provide that the board of 
examiners have power to 'examine all unliquidated 
claims against the State,' etc. The Constitution has 
vested in the board of examiners the power to 
examine and pass on all claims except those ex-
empted, and the Legislature is without authority 
to delegate such power to any other board or offi-
cer." 
It is obvious from the above quotation and by the 
Court's reliance on language from State v. Edwards, supra, 
that the Court was speaking of the authority of the Board ' 
of Examiners under the Constitution not merely its author-
ity under statutes declaratory of the Board's constitutional 
powers. 
The most recent case relating to the authority of the 
Board of Examiners is State Board of Education v. Com-
mission of Finance, (Utah 1952), 247 P. 2d 435. It is true 
that the principal question in that case was the legality of 
the composition of the Board of Education which was raised 
as a defense to a claim for payment of the salary of the 
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction, but it is signifi-
cant that more than one-third of the argument of the Board 
of Education was devoted to a discussion of the exclusive 
constitutional jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners. (See 
S. Ct. Briefs and Abstracts, Case No. 7785.) The validity 
of this argument was recognized when the Court said (247 
P. 2d at 439) : 
"At a meeting of the State Board of Education 
on October 5, 1951, the Board appointed Dr. Bate-
man to the office of State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and fixed his salary at $10,000 per an-
num. The Board of Examiners (composed of the 
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney Gen-
eral) which must approve all salary claims against 
the state, except those fixed by law, approved by a 
vote of two to one the request of the Board of Edu-
cation to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000 per 
annum." (Emphasis added.) 
See also Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626; Dall 
v. State, 42 Utah 498, 134 Pac. 632; Campbell Bldg. Co. v. 
State Road Comm., 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857, all of which 
held the Board of Examiners, not the courts, has exclusive 
jurisdiction of claims against the State. 
The Idaho cases conform to the above decisions in Utah. 
In Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Ida. 614, 51 Pac. 614, it was held 
that the Board of Examiners must approve a claim for 
supplies furnished the state insane asylum, a state institu-
tion created by the constitution (Art. X, Sec. 1, Idaho Con-
stitution). This was so even though the board of directors 
for the insane asylum had audited and approved the claim. 
The court expressly recognized the discretionary powers of 
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the Board and refused to order it to decide in a certain way. 
The court did order the Board to take some action but re-
fused to order a certain decision to be made. 
Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Ida. 288, 94 Pac. 438, presented 
the situation of disapproval by the Board of Examiners of 
the salary of certain employees of the State Auditor, a con-
stitutional state officer (Art. IV, Sec. 1, Idaho Constitu-
tion) . The court upheld the Board even though it was ad-
mitted that the employees were necessary for the conduct 
of the office, that without them the auditor could not per-
form the duties required of him by law, and that the salar-
ies were just and within the appropriation made by the 
Legislature. The court held it was without power to set 
aside and annul the constitution and statutes of Idaho by 
overturning the Board's decision. The court stated: 
"If the contention of the plaintiff be correct 
that it was the duty of the State Board of Examiners 
to allow the claims as he presented them, then there 
would be no necessity for a state board of examiners 
so far as the auditor's office was concerned, as he 
would be his own examining board and could allow 
such claims as he might deem proper so long as the 
same were within the appropriation made by the 
Legislature. This, in effect, would take from the 
State Board of Examiners the authority expressly 
given it by the Constitution and laws of this state." 
(94 Pac. at 440.) 
In State ex rel. Ha.nsen v. Pa'rsons, 57 Ida. 775, 69 P. 
2d 788, the court considered a statute appropriating money 
to cover expenditures from the state insurance fund in-
curred in excess of the appropriations for the previous 
biennium. These· claims had not been approved by the Board 
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of Examiners before the Legislature enacted the subsequent 
appropriation. The court held this unconstitutional since 
the Constitution of Idaho prohibited the Legislature from 
passing upon claims which had not been considered and 
acted on by the Board of Examiners. The previous Idaho 
cases were discussed and the constitutional jurisdiction and 
authority of the Board of Examiners was reaffirmed. 
In State ex rel. Taylor v. Robinson, 59 Ida. 486, 83 P. 
2d 983, the court held individual claims for unemployment 
compensation must be passed upon by the Board of Ex-
aminers even though federal funds in the custody of the 
State Treasurer were used to pay such claims. 
"No reflection upon the board or any of its 
employees is intended or asserted by this argument, 
but the Constitution sets up what were considered 
by its framers a.s essential safeguards as to the ex-
penditure of public funds generally. All funds in 
the hands of and under the control of the State-
the only exception being as to the coordinate consti-
tutional body the State Board of Education-must 
be disbursed under the supervision and control of 
the State Board of Examiners, and the people by 
not amending the Constitution in these particulars 
have continued to sanction and leave effective these 
safeguards, and asserted expediency, if there be 
such, may not dissolve them." (83 P. 2d at 985, 
emphasis added.) 
In Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Ida. 392, 91 P. 2d 362, the 
.~ourt held that appropriations could not be used by any 
>tate agency to establish revolving funds without the ap-
~Jroval of the Board of Examiners. 
I 
See also Gem Irr. District v. Gallet, 43 Ida. 519, 253 
,:Jac. 128; Curtis v. Moore, 38 Ida. 198, 221 Pac. 133; Davis 
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v. State, 30 Ida. 137, 163 Pac. 373; Epperson v. HoweU, 2~ 
Ida. 338, 154 Pac. 621; Kroutinger v. Board of Examiners, 
8 Ida. 463, 69 Pac. 279. 
In Nevada, the case of State v. Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 
22 Pac. 123, is in point. A statute appropriated money and 
authorized counties to claim reimbursement for expenses 
incurred as agents of the state in the conduct of a special 
election. The claim was to be certified by the respective 
boards of county commissioners and the state controller 
was then required to draw his warrant for the amount 
certified. Mandamus was sought against the controller for 
refusing to draw his warrant for the full amount of such 
a claim. He defended on the ground that the Board of 
Examiners had approved a lesser amount than that certi-
fied by the county. The court upheld this contention even 
though the statute in question did not require approval 
by the Board of Examiners. Other statutes (similar to 
the Utah statutes listed in Stipulation, par. 5, p. 3, R. 27) 
required approval by the Board of Examiners. The court 
stated that these other statutes required submission to the 
Board of Examiners ; and it added, assuming these general 
statutes were repealed as to claims under the election stat-
ute, the Constitution of Nevada itself required submission 
to the Board of Examiners and gave it the power to approve 
or disapprove such claims. The court further said in an· 
swer to the argument that a claim authorized by statute 
and appropriation was not within the jurisdiction of the 
Board: 
"The most numerous and important claimJ 
against t~e state arise from the contingent expe:M63' 
incurred in support of the government, and which 1 
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must be met as they arise. In view of the manifest 
purpose of the constitution to protect the treasury 
by requiring the board of examiners to adjust all 
claims, it cannot be held that the many and impor-
tant claims arising against the state, and which, as 
claims, have never been acted upon by the legisla-
ture, are exempted from the investigation of the 
board. Without stating at length the various posi-
tions taken by relator, there is an insuperable ob-
jection common to all. Each contention involves an 
exemption of the claim of the county from the ac-
tion of the board of examiners, and each is con-
clusively answered by the provisions of the consti-
tution defining the duties of the board. It is not 
within the power of the legislature to confer this 
authority elsewhere." (22 Pac. at 124, emphasis 
add~d.) 
The Montana cases have restricted the authority and 
;: jurisdiction of Montana's Board of Examiners contrary 
~to our contentions, but in doing so are contrary to the 
,. weight of authority as shown by the Utah, Idaho and 
~ Nevada cases. 
2. The Jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners 
Includes Claims of State Officers for Salaries 
Not Fixed by Law. 
The court below decreed that expenditures of all state 
departments and agencies were claims within the j urisdic-
'tion of the Board of Examiners (Par. 5, R. 70, 73). This 
'is in accordance with the Utah cases of State v. Edwards, 
supra, and State Board of Education v. Commission of 
1Finance, supra, as well as the Idaho cases cited. However, 
:two exceptions were made: Compensation of officers fixed 
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by law, and salaries of state officers and employees whether 
fixed by law or not (Par. 4, R. 70, 73). With the first 
exception, we agree-with the last, we disagree. 
The Board shall "examine all claims against the State 
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law 
* * * and no claim against the State, except salaries 
and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having been considered 
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners." The trial 
judge reasoned correctly, we believe, that "salaries" and 
"compensation" are not synonymous terms. (See Marion,. 
eaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac. 355, where it was de-
termined that "compensation" included mileage even though 
mileage might not be considered a salary.) But then, the 
court went on to state that the term "fixed by law'' modi· 
fies only "compensation" and not "salaries," concluding 
therefrom that all "salaries," whether fixed by law or not, 
are excepted from the jurisdiction of the Board. 
The State Board of Education has previously been before 
this Court in a mandamus action to compel the payment 
of the salary of the State Superintendent of Public Instruc· 
tion, which salary had been "fixed" by the State Board of 
Education, State Board of Education v. Commission of 
Finance, supra*. Clearly the suit involved payment of a 
"salary" not "compensation," a fact noted by the Court in 
stating that the Board of Examiners "which must approve 
all salary claims against the State, except those fixed by 
*Note: The case arose prior to Chap. 80, Laws of 1953 by which 
statute .the Legisl~ture fixed the salary of the State Sup~rintendent 
of Pubhc Instruction. 
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law" had approved the disputed salary claim. In State v. 
Edwards, supra, the plaintiff state employee argued that 
his claim for mileage previously approved by the District 
Judge, as provided by statute, was fixed by law and thus 
within the exception. After stating the rule and citing 
authorities that the salary or compensation of public offi-
cers fixed by law could be enforced by mandamus, the Court 
stated (93 Pac. at 722) : 
"* * * But all these authorities simply 
make it clear that the salary or compensation, of 
which payment may be compelled in such a proceed-
ing, must be certain and fixed by law, and, further, 
that it must appear that it is the legal duty of the 
officer, upon whom the demand is made, to allow 
or pay the amount claimed. We have not been able 
to find any case where the compensation was fixed 
by contract, or where the amount is subject to change 
at the pleasure of the person authorized to agree 
upon and fix it, wherein it was held that such com-
pensation is one fixed by law. The mere fact that 
the Legislature has, in effect, made the certificate of 
the judge the only evidence that is required to fix 
the amount due, cannot affect the conclusion that 
it is not fixed by law. It is the judge, and not the 
law, that determines and fixes the amount to be 
allowed under the particular contract under which 
the stenographer claims." 
In Bragaw v. Gooding, supra, it was admitted by de-
murrer that the State Auditor could employ and fix salaries 
of clerks and assistants. The court had no difficulty in 
holding that the Board of Examiners had acted within its 
jurisdiction in disapproving the salaries thus fixed. 
Thus, the proper interpretation of the exception limits 
it (1) to claims for salaries or compensation (2) fixed by 
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the Legislature in a sum certain ( 3) as an incident to a 
public office. For example, the salary of the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, a public officer, has been 
fixed by the Legislature in a sum certain. (Section 53-2-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Ch. 80, Laws 
of 1953.) But, by the same section, the Board of Education 
is authorized to appoint "assistant superintendents, direc-
tors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers and other 
employees," most of whom would be considered employees 
rather than officers (McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294, 
30 Pac. 1091), and whose "salaries * * * shall be fixed 
by the board" rather than by the Legislature. As to the 
former, the Legislature has exercised the required super-
vision of public funds; as to the latter, the constitutional 
powers of the Board of Examiners must be called into play. 
B. The Discretionary Authority of the Board of Ex-
aminers. 
As previously noted, the trial court determined that 
all expenditures of the State Board of Education, with two 
exceptions discussed above, are claims which must be ex-
amined by the Board of Examiners. The court held, how-
ever, that the examination was limited to "auditorial super-
vision" and the Board "cannot exercise discretion or review 
the wisdom of the expenditures." (Par. 5, R. 70, 73, Opin-
ion, R. 65.) This, we contend, is contrary to the Utah, 
Idaho and Nevada cases. 
Thoreson v. Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 21 Utah 
187, 60 Pac. 982, was the first Utah case construing the 
authority of the Board of Examiners. The Court in that 
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case ordered the Board to approve a claim under a state 
of facts where the Board admitted the justness of the claim 
but denied its legality. The Court said (21 Utah at 189) : 
"We do not hold, as intimated in appellant's 
brief, that the Board of Examiners is a mere per~ 
functory body, not capable of exercising any judg-
ment or discretion in matters of allowing or reject-
ing claims against the state, but hold that in the 
particulars mentioned in this case, where the claim 
is admitted to be just, the Board had no discretion, 
but their duties were mandatory." 
Thus, the case holds that the Board of Examiners exercises 
discretionary powers as to the justness of claims but where 
the justness of the claim is admitted, the Court can compel 
. the Board to approve a legal claim. The case does not stand 
for the proposition that only ministerial functions are per-
formed by the Board but holds where only a question of 
law is involved-the legality of the particular claim-a 
court can correct an erroneous interpretation of law by 
ithe Board. 
State v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071, enunciates 
,:the same principles as the Thoreson Case. The Court stated 
:. (34 Utah at 102) : 
"Indeed there is no dispute with regard to any 
matter of fact, but the board justify their action in 
disallowing the claim entirely upon questions of 
law * * * " 
ilAnd further (34 Utah at 107): 
"In this case the essential facts entitling the 
relator to have his claim audited and allowed are 
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all admitted. The questions, therefore, are purelJ 
questions of law. If the claim, t?erefore,. is on! 
which is admitted to be just, and 1s authonzed b~ 
law, and there is no dispute with regard to any facl 
involved, and the claim is presented to the board in 
due form as the law requires, we know of no law 
nor reason why respondents, although acting in a 
quasi-judicial capacity, should not be required to 
audit and allow the claim." 
After determining that the Board had decided the question 
of law erroneously, the Court concluded by stating (34 Utah 
at 108): 
"In view of the conceded facts, there is nothing 
upon which the respondents can legally exercise any 
discretionary powers in this case, and therefore they 
should have audited and allowed the claims." 
Thus, the Court expressly recognized the discretionary, 
quasi-judicial authority of the Board to deny claims it 
considers unjust, unnecessary, or unwise, but held that 
where the justness is admitted and only a question of law 
is involved, a court can review the Board's determination. 
The same principle was involved in Marioneaux v. 
Cutler, supra, the only difference being that the Board's 
interpretation of the law was sustained as correct. 
In the Idaho cases of Pyke v. Steunenberg, supra, and 
Bragaw v. Gooding, supra, the discretionary powers of the 
Board of Examiners were discussed. Because of the dis-
cretion residing in the Board, the court held it was power· 
less to require the Board to decide in a certain way. The 
same rule has been consistently applied in the more recent 
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Idaho cases cited. For example, in Suppiger v. Enking, 
supra, the court said: 
"The board of examiners has sole and discre-
tionary authority to decide how and in what manner 
it will pass upon and allow or reject claims against 
the state." (91 P. 2d at 366.) 
It is the law in Utah, as well as in most other states, 
that the State Auditor has only ministerial powers. See 
State Board of Land Commissioners, et al. v. Ririe, 56 Utah 
213, 190 Pac. 59. He can refuse to draw warrants for claims 
submitted to him only if the claim is unlawful and he will 
be subject to mandamus by a court if it is later determined 
that the claim is lawful. But, it is a Board of Examiners 
we are concerned with here, not an auditor or controller-
examination of claims, not auditorial supervision of ex-
penditures. 
The distinction is pointed up in Uintah State Bank v. 
Ajax, supra, and State v. Edwards, supra, in both of which 
cases mandamus was sought against the State Auditor. 
The Auditor successfully defended both actions not on the 
ground that he, as Auditor, had discretionary authority to 
disapprove the claims, but on the ground that the claims 
had not been presented to and approved by the Board of 
Examiners. This Court, in holding the claims must be 
submitted to the Board of Examiners, was not requiring 
a mere formality-a gesture to governmental red tape. 
Would it have required the plaintiffs in those cases to sub-
mit their claims to the Board of Examiners if the Board had 
no discretion to examine and approve or disapprove the 
claims? This Court realized that the Board of Examiners is 
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dependent judgment and discretion as to the justness of 
the claims it examines. 
The Board of Examiners was designed by our found-
ing fathers as an agency to check on all expenditures of 
the State. The Auditor, on the other hand, was intended 
to act as an investigating officer as to the financial con-
dition and expenditures of the State, to provide accounting 
information and to determine whether improper disposition 
of state money had been made. His functions are analogous 
to a certified public accountant who makes a periodic re-
view of the accounts, expenditures and financial condition 
of a business. But greater protection is needed for public 
funds. A check on expenditures in necessary before the 
money is paid out. Revelations of improprieties after the 
money has been dispensed are often too late to allow re-
covery. Some check before money is disbursed is needed. 
This is the responsibility of the Board of Examiners. It is a 
constitutional duty which can only be restricted by consti-
tutional amendment. 
C. The Constitutional Powers of the Board of E.ram-
iners Cannot Be Restricted by the Legisla.ture. 
The trial court held that the Legislature may modify 
the constitutional powers of the Board of Examiners (Par. 
6, R. 70, 73). This, we contend, is an erroneous interpre-
tation of Article VII, Section 13, Utah Constitution, based 
on a faulty reading of the "until otherwise provided by 
law" proviso at the beginning of the section. 
Article VII, Section 13, deals with two subjects, the 
Board of State Prison Commissioners and the Board of 
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Examiners. The "until otherwise profided by law" clause 
is contained in the first sentence of the section, which re-
lates solely and exclusively to the composition and powers 
of the Board of State Prison Commissioners. The proviso 
in question is not repeated nor incorporated in the second 
sentence of the section dealing with the composition and 
powers of the Board of Examiners. To relate the clause to 
the second sentence, all rules of grammar and the meaning 
of words must be ignored, for to do so one has to consider 
the word "they" in the second sentence of Article VII, Sec-
tion 13, as referring back to and including not only the 
named officials but also the proviso in question. Since the 
use of the personal pronoun normally, if not necessarily, 
refers only to previously named individuals, such an ex-
tension of language is not warranted. 
But assuming this was the intention of the framers of 
our Constitution, the section would then read as follows: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Secretary of State and Attorney General * * * 
shall, also, constitute a Board of Examiners, * * * ." 
Following the quoted clause is the enumeration of the pow-
ers and duties of the Board of Examiners. Even read in 
this manner, it is clear that the "until otherwise provided 
by law" clause modifies only the clause stating who shall 
constitute the Board of Examiners. It has nothing to do 
with the powers and duties of the Board of Examiners. If 
the "otherwise provided by law" statement was intended 
to affect both the membership of the Board and its powers 
as well, there would be no reason for the term "other duties" 
nor for the clause "as may be prescribed by law." That is, 
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the framers did not say the Board of Examiners should 
exercise certain specified duties and "such other duties as 
may be prescribed by law" "until otherwise provided by 
law." Thus, taking this rather far-fetched interpretation 
of the section, the most that can be said for the opening 
clause is that the Legislature may designate officials other 
than the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General 
to act as a Board of Examiners. Such an interpretation 
does not allow the Legislature to qualify the duties of the 
Board, however constituted, to examine claims against the 
State. The debates in the Constitutional Convention, though 
somewhat sketchy, support this interpretation. There were 
no debates on Article VII, Section 13, as such. However,. 
the same committee drafted Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 and 
all sections were considered by the Convention more or 
less as a whole. Thus, the principles discussed in the de-
bates on Section 12, relating to the Board of Pardons, are 
relevant to Section 13. 
The arguments on Section 12 of Article VII ran all 
the way from contending that the Governor should have 
the exclusive pardoning power to contending that the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General should 
not be members of the Board of Pardons. The question was, 
who should exercise the pard~:ming power, not \Yhat the 
powers would be. But, there was no suggestion that the 
Legislature itself exercise the pardoning power or be able 
to impose restrictions or qualifications on the power of 
whoever was given the authority to grant pardons. 
On a reconsideration of the entire executive article, the 
"until otherwise provided by law" proviso was added to 
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Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15. (Vol. II, Proceedings Utah 
Constitutional Convention, 1152.) It is significant that 
after this proviso was added, the following substitute to 
Section 12 was offered but rejected. (II Ibid. 1153) : 
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorney 
general shall constitute a board of pardons and shall 
have power to grant [pardons, etc.] * * * sub-
ject to such regulations as may be provided by law." 
It is apparent that had this substitute carried, the pardon-
'ing power could have been restricted and controlled by the 
_Legislature. That a substitute to the section as it now 
'~tands was needed to accomplish this demonstrates that the 
io 
_'until otherwise provided by law" proviso was not intended 
l 
;o qualify the powers granted by the Constitution but only 
;o allow the Legislature to change the membership of these 
~~onstitutional boards. 
But, we need not rely solely on the constitutional de-
>ates, for the Supreme Court has expressly held in Bishop 
[ 
t. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah 478, 52 Pac. 1090, 
chat the Legislature could not deprive the Board of Pardons 
::,f its constitutional powers. The Legislature had empow-
~~red the Board of Corrections rather than the Board of 
i:')ardons to parole convicts under certain restrictions and 
~-imitations. This was held unconstitutional. Accord : Car-
!r(isco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 2d 216. See also In re 
';'!lint, 25 Utah 338, 71 Pac. 531 (a court cannot exercise the 
~1,ardoning power) . 
Consideration should also be given to the particular 
lt'rording of Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Article VII, Utah 
I~ 
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Constitution. Consistent with the debates and cases above 
cited, the sections provide that the members of the various 
boards shall be certain named state officials "until other. 
wise provided by law." For every board but the Board of 
Examiners, the Legislature has exercised its prerogative 1 
by providing a different membership. But as to the powers 
of the various boards, the framers were careful to desig. 
nate whether and to what extent the Legislature could 
change their powers. For example, in Section 12, the Board 
of Pardons is given power to pardon "subject to such reg. 
ulations as may be provided by law, relative to the manner 
of applying for pardons." The Legislature then can only 
regulate the manner of applying for pardons. On the other 
hand, the Board of State Prison Commissioners "shall have 
such supervision * * * as may be provided by law," 
a clear statement authorizing complete legislative regula-
tion. The same statement is repeated in Sections 14 and 
15. Compare this with the grant of power to the Board 
of Examiners to examine all claims against the State and 
"perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law." 
Here the Legislature can only prescribe duties other than 
the duty to examine claims against the State. 
Finally, the position of the trial court is directly con· 
trary to the Utah, Idaho and Nevada cases discussed above, 
particularly the Utah cases of State v. Edu·ards, supra, and 
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, supra. All of these cases ex· 
pressly recognize the constitutional authority of the Board 
of Examiners and state that the Legislature has no power 
to interfere with this constitutional authoritY 
.. 
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POINT II 
BY STATUTE, THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES 
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
Section 53-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
as follows: 
"At the end of each month the state superin-
tendent shall file with the state board of examiners 
an itemized account of his expenses, including those 
of the state board of education, verified by his oath. 
The said board shall examine the same, and if the 
account is found to be correct and the expenditures 
necessary, shall certify the same to the state auditor. 
The state auditor shall issue a warrant on the state 
treasurer for the amount due on such account, and 
at the end of each month he shall issue his warrant 
for one-twelfth of the superintendent's annual sal-
ary." 
This provision has been a part of our law since 1896 (Sec. 
18, Ch. CXX, Laws of 1896). It provides explicitly not only 
for review of expenditures of the Board of Education by 
the Board of Examiners, but also for disapproval by the 
Board of Examiners if they deem the expenditures unnec-
essary. Such a statute is, of course, only declaratory of the 
·Board of Examiner's constitutional responsibilities and we 
do not wish to minimize our argument in Point I to that 
effect. But this statute makes clear that the Legislature, 
as well as the framers of our Constitution, have consistently 
adhered to a policy of requiring a check on expenditures of 
state agencies by the Board of Examiners. 
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Consideration should also be given to the declaratory 
statutes relating to the Board of Examiners (Stipulation, 
Par. 5, pp. 3, 4, R. 27), one of which states the Board has 
jurisdiction over claims for which an appropriation has 
been made. 
With respect to salaries, every appropriations act since 
1949 (Stipulation, Par. 7, 8, R. 28), including the 1955 
act (Sec. 12, Ch. 164, Laws of 1955), has contained an 
E·xplicit directive to the Board of Examiners to regulate 
salary schedules and control working conditions. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE, AS AGENT 
OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR BY 
STATUTE, HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR 
DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
The Commission of Finance was created in 1941 as a : 
part of a comprehensive reorganization of state depart- , 
ments and agencies. The purpose and need for this reor- ' 
ganization is set out in Governor Maw's opening message 
to the Twenty-Fourth Legislature. (See House Jourrwl, 
1941 Regular Session, page 6; Senate Journal, 1941 Regular 
Session, page 23.) His proposals and the action taken by 
the Legislature followed similar plans undertaken by 
almost every state since 1900, reorganizations which are 
still being carried on. See the discussion in H O'i(.Se v. Crevel-
ing, 147 Tenn. 589, 250 S. W. 357, particularly at 363. 
There are many treatises on this general subject which we 
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commend for the Court's consideration, particularly the 
following: Boll ens, John C., Administrative Reorganizar 
tion of the States Since 1939, University of California, 
Bureau of Public Administration, Berkeley, April 16, 1947; 
Buck A. E., The Reorganization of State Governments in 
the United States, New York City, Columbia University 
Press, 1938; Reorganizing State Government, The Council 
of State Governments, 1950. 
The basic purpose of all reorganization plans, includ-
ing Utah's plan, is to obtain increased economy and effi-
ciency in state government by centralizing authority, us-
ually in the Governor, or as Governor Maw stated, to give 
Utah a state government rather than a government of a 
hundred separate units (House Journal, Ibid, page 12; 
Senate Journal, Ibid, page 29). Vital to this plan was cen-
tralized control of expenditures of all state departments 
and agencies. The result was the creation of the Commis-
sion of Finance. Its workings were well described in Pro-
fessor G. Homer Durham's 1947 Report to the Tax Study 
;Committee of the 1945 Legislature, entitled Utilization of 
Tax Resources by State Government in Utah. He states, 
,on page 43: 
"Actually, the existing system of financial ad-
ministration focuses responsibility on the Depart-
ment of Finance. This department, created in 1941, 
lies at the heart of State government. On it, the 
legislature and the executive branch must largely 
rely for enforcement of the appropriation act and 
the maintenance of legal financial service. Section 
82C, Chapter two, Utah Code Annotated 1943, af-
fords an excellent basis for such service and control. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
Under this statute the Department of Finance has 
the legal authority and obligation to: 
"'1. Prescribe and maintain a schedule of sal-
aries and job classifications for all State 
employees except where salaries are fixed 
by statute. 
" '2. Examine all requests for personnel with 
power to approve or disapprove the same. 
" '3. Authorize travel expense and set up rules 
and regulations governing the same. 
" '4. Maintain a budget and accounting system 
and exercise accounting and budgetary 
control over all State deparbnents. 
"'5. Purchase supplies, materials, equipment1 
and services required in the administra-
tion of State departn1ents.' 
In a very real sense, this phase of the 1941 reorgan-
ization program provided, for the first time, an 
adequate 'house-keeping' agency in Utah 3tate gov-
ernment." 
Although noting its relationship to the Board of Examiners 
should be clarified, Professor Durham strongly endorsed' 
the work of the Commission and recommended that its 
powers be strengthened. He particularly approved of the 
Commission's functions in reviewing expenditures, stating 
1 
that this policing duty is "healthy" and has been properly 
exercised. 
The duty of the Commission of Finance to review ex· 
penditures is declared in 63-2-21, Utah Code Annotated:. 
1953, as follows : 
"The commission of finance shall exercise ac· 
counting control over all state departments and 
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agencies and prescribe the 1nanner and method of 
certifying that funds are available and adequate to 
meet all contracts and obligations. The commission 
shall examine and approve, or disapprove, all requi-
sitions and proposed expenditures of the several de-
partments, except salaries or compensation of offi-
cers .fixed by law, and no requisition of any of the 
departments shall be allowed nor shall any obligation 
be created without the approv·al and certification of 
the commission. The commission of finance shall 
pre-audit all claims against the state. The commis-
sion of finance shall, with the approval of the state 
auditor as to the adequacy of such documents in fa-
cilitating the post-audit of public accounts, prescribe 
all forms of requisitions, receipts, vouchers, bills or 
claims to be used by the several departments and the 
forms, procedures, and records to be maintained by 
all departmental, institutional or agency store rooms 
and exercise inventory control over such store 
rooms." (Emphasis added.) 
It was soon apparent that the italicized sentence, if 
literally applied, divested the Board of Examiners of its 
iconstitutional powers. The Attorney General was asked 
:for advice on this problem and replied in the opinion set 
~forth in Stipulation, Exhibit A, pp. 13-21, R. 43-51. His 
'~onclusion was that construing the constitutional powers 
·::3f the Board of Examiners and the statutory powers of the 
~8ommission of Finance together, the Commission of Finance 
must be considered to be only an agent for the Board of 
1~xaminers in the matter of the approval or disapproval of 
~~laims against the State. This has been the consistent in-
;erpretation followed since that time. 
·a ~!L"a . matter of_ p:r;~~tjce, _the. Co:romis§i()n. of .. Finance 
Jtletermines the mathematical accuracy of the claims and 
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the availability of funds; the Board of Examiners is pri:~ 
m;:~fly concerned with the justness or advisability of the 
'expenditures. for which the claims are made, reserving th~ 
power to control the actions of the Commission . of Fina.E_9! 
.in other matters relating to claims against the State. This 
has been the practice and, we contend, the correct practice 
in view of the express constitutional powers granted the 
Board of Examiners which we have discussed in Point I. 
However, if the Court considers this administrative 
interpretation and practice to be erroneous, we contend, as 
an alternative, that the Commission of Finance has statu-
tory authority pursuant to 63-2-13 and 63-2-21, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, to approve or disapprove expenditures 
made by all departments of the State. The language of 
63-2-21 is unequivocal: "The Commission shall examine 
and approve, or disapprove." The authority given is com-
prehensive, applicable to all expenditures of all depart-
ments with only the one exception of salaries or compen· 
sation of officers fixed by law. Based on the purpose of 
the reorganization plan, and the language used, it is clear 
the Legislature intended all departments to be subject to 
this control, including the Board of Education. It is also 
clear that the Legislature intended the Commission to pre-
vent unnecessary or unwise expenditures as well as illegal 
expenditures for which no funds are available. Otherwise, 
the sentence requiring examination and approval or disap-
proval would be unnecessary and meaningless. 
Salary claims are treated somewhat differently under 
the reorganization plan. Pursuant to 63-2-13, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, the Commission of Finance, after study, 
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prescribes a salary schedule for the various types and 
classes of employment in all state departments. After 
such a s·chedule has been adopted, no salary claim can be 
paid in excess of the salary fixed in the schedule without 
express approval of the Commission of Finance. Consis-
tent with the Attorney General's opinion above referred 
to, the salary schedule before adoption is referred to the 
Board of Examiners for its approval and claims for salaries 
in excess of the schedule must be separately approved by 
the Board. (See Stipulation, Pars. 10-11, p. 5, R. 29-30.) 
The obvious purpose and sound policy behind such a pro-
cedure is to prev~nt different pay for the same work. It 
would be unjust to employees if different pay were 
awarded for the same work merely because different de-
partments were involved. Also, it would lead to lobbying 
for additional appropriations by the departments so that 
each could attract employees from the others by higher 
salaries. 
Most of the cases resulting from state administrative 
:reorganizations have involved provisions allowing a desig-
;nated state official or finance department to disapprove 
:.salaries fixed by another state board or official. But, it 
)s obvious that salary expenditures have no different status 
~than non-salary expenditures so that cases on one aspect 
~are in point as to the other. 
In State ex rel. Yapp v. Chase, 165 Minn. 268,206 N. W. 
396, the Commission of Administration and Finance was 
Jiauthorized to fix salaries "for the various classes, grades, 
Jand titles" of all employees in all departments of the State. 
r:The Railroad and Industrial Commission, under a statute 
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giving it power to fix the salaries of its employees, fixed 
the salaries of certain employees in excess of the schedule 
adopted by the Commission of Administration and Finance. 
The court held the salary fixing power of the Industrial 
Commission to be restricted to the fixing of salaries not in 
excess of the schedule adopted by the Commission of Ad-
ministration and Finance. 
In State v. Manning, 220 Iowa 525, 259 N. W. 213, the 
court sustained the discretionary power of a financial offi. 
cer to disapprove transfer of funds from one budget item 
to another. In its opinion the court made this pertinent 
statement (259 N. W. at 220) : 
"The Legislature might have said that he should 
consent to the transfer when in his judgment it 
would be for the best interests of the taxpayers of 
the municipality, or when from his exa..111ination of 
the estimates on file as compared with the prior 
two years, he deemed it expedient or proper, or 
when in his judgment it could be safely done, or 
similar general expressions. All this is implied and 
is inherent in the very nature and purpose of the 
Budget Act, and the Legislature having entrusted 
the supervisory and directing power in his han~ 
it certainly can be presumed that in his quasi-judi· 
cial function, coupled with his administrative, super-
visory, and directory powers, he will act in the best 
interests of the taxpaying public." 
In Reeves v. Talbot, 289 ~\:y. 581, 159 S. \V. 2d 51, 
central review by the Commission of Finance of all travel 
requisitions was sustained. As chief financial officer of 
the state, the Commissioner of Finance was characterized~ 
by the court as "the watchdog of the treasury" with not 
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only accounting functions but discretionary authority to 
pass on the propriety and justification of proposed expendi-
tures of all departments of the state. The court said : 
"The legislature realized that the determination 
of incurring expenses for travel outside the state 
had to be left to the discretion of somebody, and 
believed it could well be left with the heads of the 
departments to whom it had granted so much 
greater and more important powers. But that is not 
all. Doubtless realizing that the strength of our 
form of government lies in its system of checks and 
balances which curbs the abuse of official power, 
the authority to approve or disapprove the action 
of the heads of departments in such matters, as well 
as in other contemplated disbursements, was lodged 
with the Commissioner of Finance * * * " 
The court further stated: 
"Considering the relative rights and powers of 
the heads of the departments and of the Commis-
sioner of Finance in this matter, it seems to us that 
when an executive officer makes a requisition in 
accordance with the statutes, the exercise of his 
discretion as to the propriety and legitimacy of the 
travel outside the state is entitled to high regard 
and influential consideration. It is especially his 
responsibility. If the requisition reveals a good 
· and sufficient reason for incurring the proposed 
expenditure, we think the Commissioner of Finance 
should regard it as prima facie valid and proper and 
that he may rely upon those representations and 
approve the requisition if the purpose is within the 
scope of the appropriation for the department and 
the amount is within the unexpended balance to the 
credit of the particular fund. If that is the condi-
tion he will be shielded from liability. It is not to 
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be overlooked that that officer has a second chance 
to review and control the payment of the claim. for 
reimbursement when it shall be presented. Sections 
340, 359a-1, 359a-4, Statutes. On the other hand, if 
in the exercise of a sound judgment the Commis-
sioner is of opinion that the proposed travel is not 
legitimate or proper, considering the functions of 
the department and the nature of the duties of the 
officer or employee and, as well, the purpose and 
character of the business to be attended to or if he 
regards the proposed expenditure as prima facie ex-
cessive, or if he acertains that it will exceed the 
balance of funds allotted to the department, he 
should disapprove the requisition in the manner 
prescribed by the statute." 
A similar situation was presented in SeUers v. Froh-
miller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P. 2d 666, where a provision of an 
appropriations act required the Governor's approval as to 
legality and necessity for proposed travel expenditures. 
Although holding the requirement invalid because of an 
unique provision of the Arizona Constitution prohibiting 
appropriations acts containing other than appropriated 
amounts, the court said : 
"The passage of section 6 was undoubtedly 
prompted by a legislative desire to take from the 
auditor the control and supervision of the expendi-
ture of appropriations for operation and travel and 
place it under the governor, and, in addition, to 
require every officer, before using any part of the 
sum appropriated to his department for these pur-
poses to show to the Governor the necessity for its 
use· and procure from him a requisition therefor. 
The accomplishment of this end it is clear is a 
ri.ghtful and proper subject of iegislation, but in 
VIew of sec. 20, supra, providing that the general 
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appropriations bill shall embrace nothing but ap-
propriations for the different departments of the 
state, it is equally clear that it cannot be done as a 
part of that bill." 
Another Arizona case, Industrial Commission v. Price, 
37 Ariz. 245, 292 Pac. 1099, involyed a statute authorizing 
the Industrial Commission to appoint and fix the salaries 
of its employees but providing, "Such employment and their 
compensation shall be first approved by the governor 
* * * " It was contended that the Governor had only 
a ministerial duty and the Industrial Commission was the 
sole judge of the help needed and the amount of their com-
pensation. Holding that the Governor had discretion to 
disapprove employment or the compensation thereof, the 
court said: 
"The Governor has nothing much to say as to 
who the employees shall be, but much to say as to 
their necessity. He has nothing to say as to the fix-
ing of their compensation, but, if such compensation 
as fixed by the commission seems to him to be ex-
cessive, he may disapprove it." 
It was further contended that with such a power, the Gov-
t ernor could dominate the administration of the Industrial 
; Commission. To this argument the court replied that the 
; purpose of the Legislature was merely to have a check on 
( expenditures of the Industrial Commission, a proper sub-
! ject for legislation. 
i, 
1 In Wycoff v. W. H. Wheeler & Co., 38 Okla. 771, 135 
, Pac. 399, a statute required the Governor's approval of 
' publisher's bonds for all contracts made by the State Board 
I 
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of Education acting as a State Textbook Commission. This 
was held to vest discretion in the Governor to approve or 
disapprove such bonds, a discretion which a court could not 
control. 
In California, a state which has served as the model 
for so many of our laws, a Department of Finance is vested 
with the power to review expenditures. In Ireland v. Riley, 
11 Cal. App. 2d 70, 52 P. 2d 1021, the court held that con-
tracts for liquor stamps made by the Board of Equalization 
must be approved by the Department of Finance. The court 
characterized the purpose of the California financial reor-
ganization as follows: 
"The unmistakable purpose of the Legislature 
in [creating the Department of Finance] is to con-
serve the financial interests of the state, and to pre-
vent, as far as possible, any improvident acts by any 
of the departments thereof; to give to the state such 
powers as would enable the department of finance 
to control the expenditures of state money by any 
of the several departn1ents of the state. The general 
powers extend to the supervision of all the financial 
and business policies of the state, which necessarily 
include supervision of the expenditure of moneys 
belonging to the state." 
The above case and the quotation therefrom was affirmed 
in the more recent cases of State v. Brotherhood of Railway 
Train~men, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P. 2d S51, and Treu v. Kirk-
wood, (Cal. 1953), 255 P. 2d -~09, both of which involved 
review of salaries by the Department of Finance. 
The above cases clearly hold that a check by one de-
partment or official on the exercise of the powers of another 
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department or official is constitutional and proper. Indeed 
the courts have applauded the internal system of checks 
and balances thus established. The State Board of Educa-
tion in effect contends that it has the right to be as extrava-
gant as it desires, that it can pay excessive salaries, that 
it can make unnecessary purchases, and that no one but the 
Board of Education itself can prevent such abuses. Such 
a check on expenditures is useless, for certainly the one 
who asks for and uses the funds would never admit the 
expenditures to be unnecessary or extravagant. The Legis-
lature itself could not by appropriation or general statute 
provide an effective check. A statutory specification of 
the number of employees, the number of typewriters, the 
amount of paper, etc., would be impossible to state realis-
tically two years in advance, would not provide the needed 
flexibility in administration, and would take up so much 
of the time of the Legislature as to be impractical. Yet, 
a continuing review by an independent board or official is 
necessary to secure efficient and economical administration 
of the State Government. In Utah, such a function is vested 
in the Board of Examiners and Commission of Finance. 
We submit that the plain meaning and purpose of the 
present statutes of Utah authorize and require the Com-
mission of Finance to review and, in its discretion or as 
agent of the Board of Examiners, to approve or disapprove 
expenditures of the State Board of Education. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHOR-
IZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO AP-
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PROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINT-
MENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, INCLUDING 
EXPERTS AND SPECIALLY QUALIFIED PER-
SONNEL. 
Section 63-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
as follows: 
"The commission of finance shall examine all 
requests for personnel and shall approve or disap-
prove the same and no new position shall be created 
and no vacancy shall be filled until the commission 
has certified to the department requesting the crea-
tion of a new position or the filling of the vacancy 
that the position is necessary to carry on the work 
of such department in an efficient and business-like 
manner and that the necessary funds therefor are 
available to the department. The commission shall 
investigate the need for every existing position in 
every department and shall report its findings to the 
board of examiners with its recommendations for 
the most effective means of discontinuing unneces-
sary positions." 
This statute is another part of the state reorganization plan. 
Centralized personnel control is vested in the Commission 
of Finance in order to pron1ote more efficient utilization 
of employees and to prevent the creation and continuance 
of unnecessary positions. The discretion vested in the Com· 
mission is apparent for it is to "approve or disapprove"· 
all requests for personnel and to determine whether a new' 
position is "necessary" for the performance of the work 
of the department making a request. 
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The statute speaks for itself. To avoid repetition we 
refer the Court to the cases and arguments in Point III. 
We only emphasize that the authority of the Commission 
of Finance is effective only as a check on the exercise of 
the powers of the various departments of the State. Para-
phrasing Industrial Commission v. Price, supra, the Com-
mission of Finance has nothing to say as to who the em-
ployees shall be but much to say as to their necessity. 
POINT V 
THE DUTY OF THE BUDGET OFFICER, 
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVER-
NOR, TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK 
PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
By Section 63-2-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (Sup-
:~lemental Record, Par. 18, p. 5) the Budget Officer under 
I;he direction of the Governor has power to "revise, alter, 
lecrease, or change" the allotments requested in the Board 
)f Education's work program. The actual operation of this 
~!ystem is described in Supplemental Record, Par. 19, p. 6. 
(1: This is an integral part of that part of the state reor-
1
tranization relative to finances. It requires each depart-
, nent to estimate its financial needs. It is important to 
lli 
ealize that not only are appropriations subject to the re-
a~~ 
uirement of a work program but all other funds available 
efi 
:> the particular department are included. Thus, federal :n~ latching funds, land grant funds, tuitions, fees, or any 
ther moneys available to the department must be stated 
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and accounted for. The result is that the department knows 
what funds it has to work with and can plan accordingly) 
the Governor controls and, by controlling, takes the re-
sponsibility for policies involving the expenditure of money, 
and the public and the Legislature have comprehensive and 
accurate figures by which it can be determined what funds 
are available and from that information how efficiently our 
government is being run. 
As to the constitutionality of this procedure, we con-
tend the statute to be an ordinary exercise of the police 
power. The Legislature has given the Governor, assisted 
by the Budget Director, the duty to supervise the fiscal 
policies of the State so that full value is received by the 
taxpayers from the taxes they pay to support our govern-
ment. To this legislation, as well as all other legislation, 
the well known presumption of constitutionality applies. 
A similar grant of power to the Governor was referred 
to in Chez v. Utah State Building Commission, 93 Utah 538J 
74 P. 2d 687. There a statute provided: 
"The Governor shall haYe authority to reduce or 
transfer items or parts thereof within any approJI' 
riation, or eliminate any appropriation made herein, 
or transfer any appropriation or part thereof to the 
general fund." 
Although no question was raised as to the discretion thus 
vested in the Governor, this Court held it to be proper, 
saying, "in the absence of a constitutional provision to the 
contrary, the power of the Legislature on the subject of 
appropriations is plenary." 
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In State ex rel. Boyle v. Ernst, 195 Wash. 214, 78 P. 
2d 526, a statute provided that no expenditure for welfare 
should be made "except upon allotments approved by the 
Governor." A taxpayer, asserting certain welfare expendi-
tures should be made, sought mandamus against the Direc-
tor of the Washington Welfare Department, whose defense 
was that the Governor had failed to approve allotments 
for welfare purposes. The taxpayer argued the Governor's 
power was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power. The court replied : 
"* * * of necessity the legislature must del-
egate to executive and administrative officers the 
power to expend state funds. It may and does set 
up such safeguards and limitations as it may deem 
expedient-as in this instance, where it has prohib-
ited expenditures except upon quarterly budgets 
approved by the director, and from allotments made 
by the governor. Should the court, in face of these 
statutory provisions, grant the writ sought, its de-
cree would amount to nothing short of usurpation 
of legislative power and the assumption of execu-
tive and administrative functions." 
Not only did the Washington Supreme Court refuse to de-
clare the Governor's budgetary control powers unconsti-
tutional but held that to do so would be an unconstitutional 
invasion by the judiciary of legislative and executive pow-
ers. 
The Washington court was correct in holding there was 
t. no delegation of legislative power by a statute granting 
Jij! budgetary control powers to the Governor. It is funda-
~~~ mental that an appropriation is only a maximum in excess 
of which a state department may not spend funds. Approp-
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riations are not directions by the Legislature that the sum 
appropriated must be spent. They are only authorizations} 
to spend not more than a certain amount-"so much thereof 
as may be necessary" is the term used in appropriations. 
Explicit in every appropriation is an authorization to the 
board or official in charge of the agency to which the ap-
propriation is made to spend less than the entire appropria-
tion if the entire sum is not needed. Except for salaries 
and compensation fixed by law, unlimited authority is given 
to "revise, alter, decrease or change" proposed expenditures. 
Happily, there are some boards and officials who do exer-
cise some restraint in the spending of state money, who 
do feel a responsibility to the taxpayers, and who believe 
they have no inherent right to spend the money appropri-
ated to them regardless of need. That this is both constitu-
tional and commendable cannot be denied. See Stephen~ v. 
Chambers, 34 Cal. App. 660, 168 Pac. 595 at 600; State 
Board of Health v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 231, 23 P. 2d 941 
(Syl. 3). 
Considering this in the light of 63-2-20, which statute 
is made a condition to all appropriations (Sees. 1 (b) and 
6 (a), Ch. 164, Laws of Utah 1955), it is apparent that the 
budgetary control power of the Governor is nothing more 
than a legislative authorization to save state money if the 
Governor, aided by statistical information and advice from 
the Budget Director, deems it necessary. There can be no 
objection to placing in the Governor and Budget Director 
a power which all department heads would have even with· 
out any legislation. True, the Governor and Budget Direc· 
tor can supervise the department heads in this respect, but 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
this is only a matter of administration of the State Govern-
ment which the Legislature, in its discretion, has deemed 
a wise public policy. If the plan does not work well, it is 
up to the Legislature, not the courts, to change it. 
There are, of course, other purposes achieved by 63-
2-20. Expenditures are kept within appropriations and other 
available funds; the department is advised what funds it 
'~an use ; accounting is simplified and clarified ; and finan-
1 
>ial information is available to the public and the Legisla-
ture. We have limited our discussion to the authority of 
;he Budget Officer and Governor to revise work programs, 
~or respondent has complained only of that. 
POINT VI 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IS NOT 
A FOURTH BRANCH OF STATE GOVERN-
MENT. 
The court below stated in its opinion (R. 61) : 
"The Constitution recognizes four general fields 
of Government in and by the State: Legislative, 
Executive, .Judicial and Educational." 
similar statement was made in the Conclusions of Law 
·• nd Judgment (Par. 1, R. 70, 72). It is easy to see that 
'uch a concept has far-reaching and drastic effects upon 
1e present practice under our Constitution. The court 
Jggested some of the changes which would flow from this 
mcept. It was reasoned that powers are either granted or 
: ~sted, granted powers being those which may be cancelled 
revoked, whereas vested powers are those that "cannot 
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be cancelled, withdrawn, vacated or annulled by the will 01 
by the act of the grantor" (R. 60). It was then noted thai 
Article X, Section 8, of the Utah Constitution, relating tc 
the Board of Education, vests the general control and sup. 
ervision of the public school system in the State Board of ' 
Education. Implicit in this reasoning and the specific ref. 
erence to the term "vested" in Article X, Section 8, is the 
result that these powers which are vested in the State Board 
of Education cannot he withdrawn nor cancelled by the 
will of the grantor, to wit, the people of the State of Utah. 
As applied to the particular issues raised in this case, 
it was determined that the control and supervision which 
was vested by the Constitution in the State Board of Edu· 
cation means that the Board "must have the exclusive 
power and right to manage, handle, invest, expend, employ 
and supervise all funds and personnel within its jurisdic· 
tion." (Par. 3, R. 70, 73.) This we contend to be erroneous 
and contrary to both the practice and interpretation of our 
State Constitution. 
Consider Article X, Section 8, for a moment. It pro-
vides, as amended : 
"The general control and supervisiOn of the 
Public School System shall he vested in a State Board 
of Education, the members of which shall be elected 
as provided by law." 
This merely establishes a State Board of Education to exer-' 
cise general control and supervision of the public schook 
It is only a declaration of general policy requiring Iegislti 
tive implementation to become effective. That this is SDl 
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was the holding of State Board of Education v. Commis-
sion of Finance, supra. It does not operate to vest constitu-
tional powers in the State Board of Education. It is merely 
:descriptive. In Salt Lake City v. Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654, this Court stated: 
"Article X of our Constitution, entitled 'Edu-
cation', provides that the control of the public school 
system, which includes all schools of whatever kind 
and grade, is vested in the Legislature." (Emphasis 
added.) 
~Based upon this, the Court reasoned that local boards of 
,:~ducation were subject to legislative control and their pow-
;~rs and duties were subject to extension or limitation only 
.JY the Legislature with the result that city regulations 
:~ould not be applied to schools without authorization by the 
, Legislature. 
Such an interpretation obviously makes good sense not 
j,:mly because it comports with our understanding of the 
·epublican form of government but also because it complies 
.!xplicitly with Article V, Section 1, of our Constitution. 
II, 
;:)olicitous as our founding fathers were to the needs and 
)rogress of education, they would not have said in one 
i\1reath that the "powers of the government of the State of 
~Jtah shall be divided into three distinct departments," and ~ 
n another say that the State Board of Education is a fourth 
lepartment of government, exercising broad powers over 
1:he public school system, which powers cannot be withdrawn 
j1tor circumscribed by the people of the State of Utah nor 
~'Y its Legislature. 
w 
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A similar contention was made in Montana in State ex 
rel. Public Service Commission of Montana, et al. V. Bran. 
non, et al., 86 Mont. 200, 283 Pac. 200, 67 A. L. R. 1020. 
There a statute required a professor at the University of 
Montana to act as state chemist. Article 11, Section 11, 
Montana Constitution, provides: 
"The general control and supervision of the 
state university and the various other state educa-
tional institutions shall be vested in a state board of 
education, whose powers and duties shall be pre-
scribed * * * by law. * * *" 
It was contended that this provision of the state constitu-
tion prevented the Legislature from imposing a non-educa-
tional duty on a university professor. In holding to the 
contrary, the court stated: 
"The assertion that the Legislature is without 
power to prescribe or regulate the functions of the 
University or one of its units cannot be admitted. 
That the board of education is 'within the scope of 
its functions, co-ordinate and equal with the legis-
lature' must be denied. 'The powers of the govern· 
ment of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments : The Legislative, executive, and judi· 
cial, and no person or collection of persons charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging w 
one of these departments shall exercise any powers 
properly belonging to either of the others, except 
as in this constitution expressly directed or per· 
mitted.' Section 1, art. 4, Constitution. 
. "The board of education is a part of the execu· 
tlve department, and is but an agency of the stau 
government. The Legislature may prescribe the 
extent of the powers and duties to be exercised by 
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the board in the general control and supervision of 
the University of Montana. The Legislature may 
broaden the functions of the University, or any of 
its units. It may require research and experimental 
work to a greater extent than is now being carried 
on, and for the public benefit may require the dis-
charge of functions in new fields. In other words, 
the state may extend, and add power to, its devel-
opmental arm." 
Thus, Article X, Section 8, does not of itself vest con-
stitutional powers in the Board of Education. It follows 
that the Powers of the Board of Examiners, Commission 
of Finance and Governor are in no way in conflict with 
Article X, Section 8. 
Even considering general control and supervision of 
the schools to be a self-executing grant of power, it must 
nevertheless be held that claims made by the Board of 
G 
~E Education must be approved by the Board of Examiners 
~ and the Commission of Finance as agent of the Board of 
1i Examiners. The responsibilities of the Board of Exam-
~; iners only relate to the wise use of funds by state agencies 
:i including the Board of Education. Certainly, the Board 
tt 
~ of Education would be the last to admit that it is wholly 
m concerned with spending money and does not have addi-
tional important policy making and supervisory functions 
~ which do not involve expenditures. It is only the money 
11: 
~ spending powers of the Board of Education that the Board 
of Examiners supervises, and as to this, the Examiners 
tt are not only justified but required by the Constitution to 
:~continue such supervision. This does not qualify the pow-
!tf- ers of the Board of Education. Within its powers it has 
!l~ 
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the initiative to do what it will. Only when it makes an 
unwise or illegal expenditure does the Board of Examiners 
act to restrain them. The extravagant or unlawful exercisJ 
of the spending powers of the Board of Education are re-
strained, not the existence or extent of the powers granted. 
As was stated by the Idaho court in State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Robinson, supra, "the people of the State through the Con-
stitution have placed the State Board of Examiners as the 
final arbiters of expenditures" and further "the Constitu-
tion sets up what were considered by its framers as essential 
safeguards as to the expenditure of public funds generally,1, 
These same essential safeguards on expenditures are a part 
of the Utah Constitution and cannot be impaired by the 
Judiciary, the Legislature, or even by the Board of Educai 
tion. Only the people, by constitutional amendment, can 
alter this principle of our State Government. 
POINT VII 
IN DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE DEPART-
MENTS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS 
DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO APPOINT 
COUNSEL. 
It was conceded below that the Attorney General, as 
legal adviser of all state officers (Article VE, Sec. 18, 
Utah Constitution) and being in charge "of all civil legal 1 
matters in which the State is in anywise interested" (67· 
5-1 (1), U. C. A. 1953), is the legal adviser of the State 
Board of Education, its officers and employees and that, as 
a general rule, the Board of Education has no authority to 
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employ its own counsel. See Annotation, 137 A. L. R. 818. 
It was contended, however, and the court below so held that 
when a dispute arises between the Board of Education 
and other departments or agencies, counsel may be em-
ployed without the consent of the Attorney General. 
The problem is not easy of solution and we wish to 
assure the Court that what we say here is not aimed at the 
able attorneys for respondent. 
We realize that the Attorney General is in no differ-
ent position than any other attorney in being unable to 
represent both sides of a controversy. Nor can the matter 
be solved by having different attorneys in the Attorney 
General's office represent each side, a fact Justice Larson 
noted in his concurring opinion in Chez v. Utah State Build-
ing Commission, supra. See also State v. Hendrix (Ariz. 
1942), 124 P. 2d 769. 
Thus, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, there is 
the policy of having a single legal adviser for all state de-
partments. One of the purposes of such a policy is, we 
believe, to avoid duplication of effort and expense. Further-
more, as applied to disputes between departments, it has 
the effect of providing an arbitrator, for most of such 
disputes are settled by an opinion rendered by the Attorney 
General. On the other hand is the policy of our adversary 
system of jurisprudence which has shown that the best 
presentation of both sides of a dispute occurs when each 
is represented independently. 
In such a dilemma, we believe the Attorney General 
has authority to employ special assistant attorneys general 
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for the side he chooses not to represent. See Reiter v. 
Wallgren (Wash.), 184 P. 2d 571. This should be done in 
every case where the Attorney General, on his own behalf 
or as attorney for another state department, is suing a 
state department or official for violations of the Constitu-
tion or statutes (criminal violations, of course, excepted). 
This is so even though he has the statutory duty to defend 
all state departments and officers (See 67-5-1 (1)) for as 
noted in Sta.te ex rel. Dunbar, Attorney General v. State 
Board of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996: 
"His [the Attorney General's] paramount duty 
is made the protection of the interests of the people 
of the state, and, where he is cognizant of violations 
of the constitution or the statutes by a state officer, 
his duty is to obstruct, and not to assist, and, where 
the interests of the public are antagonistic to those 
of state officers, or where state officers may conflict 
among themselves, it is impossible and improper for 
the attorney general to defend such state officers." 
But where one department has a grievan°e agajnst 
another and the Attorney General, as a lawyer, feels such 
a claim to be unsubstantial, a different rule must be applied. 
In such a case, we contend, the Attorney General can refuse 
to appoint special counsel. This has the effect, it is true, 
of denying the department the right to prosecute its claim. 
Yet in such a case, is not the duty of the Attorney General 
to provide legal representation to all departments subordi-
nate to his primary duty to protect the interests of the 
people of the State? One of the beneficial results of a single 
legal adviser is the prevention of groundless litigation and 
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the avoidance of unnecessary expenditures of public funds 
for legal expense. 
This is not to say that the Attorney General should 
or would refuse to appoint counsel where he disagrees with 
the claims of the prospective plaintiff. He must exercise his 
discretion as a lawyer even though personally he believes the 
claim unsound or officially he has taken a contrary position. 
If a substantial question exists, counsel should be appointed; 
if not, counsel should be denied. Bear in mind, the decision 
to proceed with litigation is a decision which the depart-
ments themselves are not qualified to make. 
We submit that the Attorney General, as legal adviser 
of all state officers and having charge as attorney "of all 
civil legal matters in which the State is in anywise inter-
ested," is the only official under our Constitution and stat-
utes to make such a decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental issue underlying this case is whether 
the present structure of State Government in Utah provides 
for a system of checks and balances on the expenditure of 
public funds. We contend such a system exists and applies 
to the State Board of Education along with all other de-
partments and agencies of the State. We contend that the 
people of the State of Utah who adopted our Constitution 
established such a system through the Board of Examiners 
and that the people, through their representatives in the 
Legislature, expanded and amplified this system through 
the 1941 reorganization plan. Our state educational agen-
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cies, important as they are in carrying out so vital and 
fundamental a state service as education, are but one aspect 
of the total functions of the State. They are not so im-
portant as to be a government unto themselves, unrestricted 
and unsupervised by any other state department or agency 
and not subject to control by even the Legislature. This, 
we submit, is not and cannot be the law in Utah. 
The judgment of the court below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
H. R. WALDO, JR., 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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